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Building and sustaining solidarity is an enduring challenge in all liberal-democratic societies. 1 The claims of solidarity require individuals to tolerate views and practices they dislike, to accept democratic decisions that go again their beliefs or interests, and to moderate the pursuit of their own economic self-interest to help the disadvantaged. Ensuring that individuals are willing to accept these "strains of commitment," to borrow John Rawls' apt phrase, has been a worry even in relatively homogeneous societies, and the challenge seems even greater in ethnically and religiously diverse societies. Anxiety about the impact of diversity on solidarity has been a recurring theme in both academic scholarship and public debates around immigration and multiculturalism. In order to better understand the nature of this challenge, we need to understand the meaning of solidarity, and the mechanisms by which it can be enhanced or diminished.
Our approach to these questions focuses on the sources of solidarity. Recent research has concentrated on diagnosing the dynamics that undermine solidarity and generate backlash and exclusion in diverse societies. This is understandable, since political life in democratic countries has been characterized by both neoliberal attacks on the welfare state and populist attacks on immigration. However, we look at the politics of diversity from the opposite direction, exploring the potential sources of support for an inclusive solidarity. How is solidarity built? How is it sustained over time? How has been strengthened as well as weakened in the contemporary era? Reframing the animating question in this way does not necessarily generate greater optimism about the future prospects for an inclusive solidarity. But it does point to the need for a more comprehensive approach, which searches for both the origins of backlash and the sources of support for inclusive redistribution. Posing the question in this way also points to the need for longer time horizons, taking the analysis back into the 19 th and 20 th century to understand how solidarity was built and institutionalized during the transition to industrial society, and then tracing the process forward into the diverse societies of the 21 st century.
Our approach also highlights the political sources of solidarity. Considerable research has focused on the economic and social factors that influence the willingness of the public to accept and support newcomers and minorities. There are many studies of the extent to which attitudes to immigrants are shaped by perceptions of economic threat and feelings of economic security, or by interpersonal contact across ethnic lines.
2 Economic and social patterns are undoubtedly important, but they are already well-studied, and more attention needs to be paid now to the broader political context within which they operate. Solidarity is a highly political phenomenon. While perceptions of economic threat and patterns of inter-ethnic contact matter, their impact is conditioned by prevailing political discourses and identities, by the actions of political agents, and by policy regimes such as the welfare state and citizenship and integration policies. Our framework is accordingly multi-layered, incorporating three levels of political life: conceptions of the political community, political agents, and political institutions and policies. In our view, these three elements -and the interactions among them -are critical.
The volume brings together cutting-edge research to analyze the impact of diversity on solidarity, and to explore the ways in which political contexts shape this relationship. We also bring normative political theory and empirical social science together in a mutually enriching way. Political theorists have invested a lot of time and energy in thinking about the political sources of solidarity, and arguably have taken this issue more seriously than many fields of contemporary social science. Political theory, we believe, offers some important insights into solidarity that can inform social science research, although equally we look to social science research to temper some of the more extravagant speculations of theorists. This then is our initial motivating question: What types of political communities, political agents and political institutions and policies serve to sustain solidarity in contexts of diversity? Answering this question requires us to step back and ask some prior questions. Is solidarity really necessary for successful modern societies? And if it is needed, is diversity really a threat to solidarity, or are anxieties about diversity a distraction from, or misdiagnosis of, deeper forces that are weakening the sense of mutual support in modern societies?
This Introduction is therefore organized around three sets of questions: (1) What is solidarity and is it important? (2) Is solidarity in decline and is diversity to blame? And (3) What are the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies? Based on the evidence provided in the chapters in this volume and the wider literature, we advance a number of propositions which are more than untested hypotheses but less than firm conclusions, and which represent directions for new research.
It is helpful to foreshadow our conclusions. Regarding question 1, we argue that solidarity is indeed important, and that self-interested strategic action alone is unlikely to generate a just society. Regarding question 2, we argue that while the overall demise of solidarity has been overstated, inclusionary forms of solidarity are clearly fragile. Regarding question 3, we will argue that solidarity does not emerge spontaneously or naturally from economic and social processes but is inherently built or eroded though political action. The politics that builds inclusive solidarity may be conflictual in the first instance, but the resulting solidarity is sustained over time when it becomes incorporated into collective (typically national) identities and narratives, when it is reinforced on a recurring basis by political agents, and -most importantly -when it becomes embedded in political institutions and policy regimes.
What is solidarity and is it important?
Like most concepts in the social sciences, the idea of 'solidarity' admits of a variety of meanings and uses.
3 Our use of the term is distinguished by two key features that are worth highlighting: we think of solidarity as a set of attitudes; and we are particularly interested in solidarity at the level of society as a whole. In both respects, our usage differs from other common approaches to solidarity, and it is important to explain our focus.
First, we use the term to refer to a set of attitudes and motivations, as opposed to practices or policies such as non-discriminatory hiring practices or redistributive programs, which may be sustained by such attitudes. In particular, we take solidarity to refer to attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need. This focus on attitudes stands in contrast to other approaches to solidarity, which focus on behaviour rather than motivations. It is certainly true that prosocial behaviour and inclusive social practices can arise from multiple motivations, including purely prudential or self-interested ones. Indeed, Kant famously argued that "The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils", and that a well-ordered state does not require citizens to be virtuous or altruistic. However, our assumption is that the strains of commitment make self-interest insufficient or unreliable on its own to maintain a good society, especially in the context of growing diversity, and that citizens must also have, if not virtue or altruism, at least some degree of solidarity: they must at times be motivated by attitudes of mutual concern and mutual obligation towards their fellow co-citizens. We return to this assumption below.
These attitudes of mutual concern are multi-faceted, and it is useful to distinguish three different dimensions of solidarity:
 Civic Solidarity: characterized by mutual tolerance; an absence of prejudice; a commitment to living together in peace, free from inter-communal violence; acceptance of people of diverse 3 For attempts to distinguish different conceptions of solidarity in the contemporary literature, see Bayertz 1998; Scholz 2008; Kolers 2012. ethnicities, languages and religions as legitimate members of the community, as belonging, as part of "us"; and an openness to newcomers from diverse parts of the world.
 Democratic solidarity: characterized by support for basic human rights and equalities, such as the equality of men and women; support for the rule of law and for democratic norms and processes, including the need to advance reasoned positions in public debates, equal participation of citizens from all backgrounds, tolerance for the political expression of diverse cultural views consistent with basic rights and equalities, and acceptance of compromises among legitimate contending interests.
 Redistributive Solidarity: characterized by support for redistribution towards the poor and vulnerable groups; support for the full access of people of all backgrounds, including newcomers, to core social programs; support for programs that recognize and accommodate the distinctive needs and identities of different ethnocultural groups.
This tripartite conception of solidarity is distinctive, and differs from the European tradition of thinking of solidarity in purely redistributive terms. But exclusive attention to redistribution does not fully capture the strains of commitment in diverse societies. What we are calling civic and democratic inclusion solidarity are also critical to a just society: societies with robust welfare states can still be subject to waves of xenophobia or intolerance. We should not assume that all three dimensions move in tandem over time, or are influenced by the same factors. Comparing across the three dimensions holds the potential for generating more nuanced understandings of the impact of ethnic and religious diversity in the contemporary era. Our aim is, in part, to explore the ebb and flow of these three dimensions of solidarity, as well as their sources and functions in contexts of ethnocultural diversity.
Second, we are interested in solidarity at the macro-level of society, which in the contemporary world means effectively the level of the state. In this, we stand in one of the classical traditions in social theory, represented most clearly by Emile Durkheim. Durkheim insisted in the 1880s that the core question facing the emerging discipline of sociology was: "What are the bonds which unite men one with another?" (Lukes 1972: 139) , and he appealed to solidarity as the glue that binds society and prevents it from disintegrating. However, this is not the only approach to solidarity in the classical tradition. 4 Other theorists saw solidarity as a phenomenon of subgroups, rather than of society as a whole. Weber located the basis for solidarity in the interests, norms and duties of social groups or professions; and although Marx seldom used the term, his few references concerned solidarity within the working class. Contemporary sociologists, especially in North America, have also largely shied away from talking about solidarity at the macro level, and instead explore solidarity at the meso level, with a focus on local communities, social movements and marginalized populations. Attitudes of solidarity, in much of the contemporary sociological literature, are seen as creating bonds within and amongst subaltern groups to help their struggles against oppression or exclusion by the larger society, not as something that unites citizens as members of the nation.
5 Indeed, if anything, societal-level solidarity is sometimes seen as the cause of this very oppression and exclusion of subaltern groups. For example, the language of national solidarity has been used in some countries to justify the imposition of coercive or exclusionary measures on immigrants and refugees, who are seen as not belonging to, and even as threats to, the nation. While solidarity within and amongst subaltern groups is widely seen as a progressive force, the classical idea of societal-level national solidarity is now widely seen, implicitly or explicitly, as at best mythical, and at worst dangerous and exclusionary.
The result has been what several commentators have described as the curious absence of solidarity as a subject of research in sociology (Reynolds 2014: 1; Alexander 2014) , in political science (Stjerno 4 A useful source on conceptions of solidarity among classical social theorists is Stjernø 2005. 5 This is sometimes described as the "agonistic" conception of solidarity -a resource to be used by one group in society in political contestation with its adversaries (e.g., Mouffe 1995 Mouffe , 1999 Mouffe , 2000 Kolers 2012) . 2005: 20) or in moral and political philosophy (Bayertz 1998: 293; Scholz 2008: 10) . Wilde speculates that this is because solidarity is seen as "confined to the realm of rhetoric" -as a rhetorical trope of politicians -and not something fit for serious theoretical work (Wilde 2007: 171) . 6 Alexander speculates that solidarity is ignored because it does not fit well with important theories of modern society:
Solidarity is a central dimension of social order and social conflict, yet it has largely been absent from influential theories of modern society. Most of the big thinkers, classical, modern and contemporary, have conceived prototypically modern relationships as either vertical or atomized. Modernization is thought to have smashed affectual and moral fellow-feeling: because of commodification and capitalist hierarchy (Marx), because of bureaucracy and individualistic asceticism (Weber) , because of the growing abstraction and impersonality of the collective consciousness allows egoism and anomie (Durkheim). Postmodernity is typically seen as liquefying social ties and intensifying narcissistic individualism (Baumann); or as creating new forms of verticality, for example, the disciplinary cage (Foucault). (Alexander 2014: 303) In short, "much of contemporary social theory has tried to make solidarity disappear". Yet we agree with Alexander that solidarity "remains a central dimension of cultural, institutional and interactional life in contemporary societies" (Alexander 2014: 304) , and that for justice to be possible, "citizens need to be motivated by solidarity, not merely included by law" (Calhoun 2002: 153) .
While broad in scope, it is important to emphasize that this form of national or societal solidarity does remain bounded and differs from pure humanitarianism. The attitudes of solidarity we are interested in embody the mutual concern and obligation we have as members of a society, and typically appeal to some image of a decent, good or just society. Social justice, in this sense, is rooted in an ethic of membership. To be sure, a sense of shared nationhood is not required for us to show a humanitarian concern for the suffering of others. We can be moved to provide emergency aid in response to famines in distant societies, or to provide emergency health care for tourists who fall ill. These are humanitarian responses to needs that do not (or need not) depend on any sense of bounded solidarity. But social justice involves an ongoing commitment to create and uphold just institutions, including for example the social policies that help people avoid getting sick in the first place. Canadians have a humanitarian obligation to assist anyone who has a heart attack on a Toronto street, whether they are tourists or citizens, but in the case of citizens, we also have an obligation to identify and address factors such as economic insecurity that make some people much more vulnerable to heart attacks than others. We typically do not think we have a comparable obligation with respect to tourists. We might say that justice amongst members is egalitarian, whereas justice to strangers is humanitarian, and social justice in this sense arguably depends on bounded solidarities.
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Some cosmopolitan theorists have raised philosophical objections to this picture of bounded solidarity, and argue that we should think of ourselves as equally obligated to all humans, close or distant, insiders or outsiders. 8 We will not enter into that philosophical debate here, except to note that (a) all existing welfare states do rely on bounded solidarity; and (b) we should not assume that renouncing appeal to bounded solidarities and removing the distinction between insiders and outsiders will lead to levelling up the treatment of outsiders. It might instead lead to levelling down of the 6 For similar observations about how solidarity has been dismissed by academics as "rhetorical" or "ceremonial", see Reynolds 2014: 1; Laitenen and Pessi 2014: 1. 7 As Laitenen and Pessi put it, "as solidarity is often based on we-thinking, it can be separated from not only anti-social egocentrism, but also from one-sided `thou-centrism', such as altruism, sympathy, caring, or Christian charity. While these concentrate on the wellbeing of the other or you, the target of concern in solidarity can be us together" (2014: 2). 8 For key texts in the global justice literature, see Caney 2005; Brock 2009; Tan 2004 . For an application to solidarity in Europe, see Kochenov 2015. treatment of insiders. It may be that bounded solidarity was (and continues to be) needed to motivate people to accept obligations beyond duties of rescue and humanitarian need. This, then, is the crux of our understanding of solidarity: it is attitudinal in nature and societal in scope. We are interested in attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need, which transcend ethno-religious differences, operate at a societal scale and have civic, democratic and redistributive dimensions.
Why is solidarity important? As noted earlier, our assumption is that solidarity helps motivate people to accept the strains of commitment involved in building and maintaining a decent, good or just society, particularly in contexts of diversity. Solidarity, on our view, is important not so much for its intrinsic value, as a component of individual flourishing or a virtuous life, but for its functional role in motivating compliance with the demands of justice.
10 Of course, if solidarity is to be effective, it needs to be politically mobilized -solidarity is not self-enacting, and it may sometimes be left untapped or may be politically blocked. But we nonetheless assume that solidarity is a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition of a just or fair society. The definition of a "just society" is controversial, but for our purposes we might define it in a modest way as a society that seeks to protect the vulnerable, to ensure equal opportunities, and to mitigate undeserved inequalities particularly if they are at risk of being passed on intergenerationally.
So this is our first presupposition: (bounded) solidarity is needed for just institutions. This is by no means uncontroversial. There are those -including Jacob Levy in this volume -who argue that national-level solidarity is unrealistic in modern societies, and moreover is not necessary, since a wellordered society can arise even in its absence. Indeed, there are long-standing alternative explanations for the rise of inclusive politics and redistributive policies that do not rely on appeal to any preexisting feelings of national solidarity, but emphasize instead the role of self-interest, strategic action, contestation and conflict. For example, a prominent approach to explaining the historical development of welfare states has been "power resource theory", which associates a strong welfare state with the relative strength of left political coalitions, incorporating strong labour movements and successful left political parties, particularly social democratic parties (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985 Stephens 1979) . On this view, the size and shape of welfare states is determined by the balance of power between those who have a self-interest in expanding the welfare state and those who have a self-interest in reducing it. The outcome may be a stronger welfare state if trade unions and social democratic parties are particularly powerful and/or able to form strategic coalitions with other popular forces. But this need not require or entail that anyone acts out of national solidarity.
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Similar strategic explanations have been given for what we are calling democratic solidarity, such as the expansion of the franchise to women, racial minorities and immigrants. The spread of the franchise was, in at least some cases, the result, not of a new social consensus on a more inclusive definition of who belongs to the nation, but of the strategic calculations by some parties that enfranchising certain outgroups would assist them in their competitive electoral struggle against other parties. This is a central claim in Levy's chapter, which emphasizes partisan contestation over 9 And once bounded solidarity is in place, it may serve as a source for more global solidarity. A study of "global good Samaritans" showed that, in many cases, the impulse to global concern was rooted in national identities: acting globally was a way of expressing one's identity as a "good Swede" or a "good Canadian" (Brysk 2009 ). The fact that countries with the highest levels of domestic redistribution also have the highest level of foreign aid also suggests that "the achievement of justice at home in fact sustains justice abroad" (Noel and Therien 2002) , and that "individuals project their values from home abroad" (Rathburn 2007) . This suggests that a commitment to global justice often grows out of national solidarities, rather than the suppressing of such national solidarities. For a more extended discussion of how cosmopolitan concerns can be "rooted" in national solidarities, see Kymlicka and Walker 2002. 10 For a discussion of the intrinsic versus instrumental value of solidarity, see chapter 2 by David Miller. 11 Trade unions themselves may depend on solidarity amongst workers, but even if so, this "agonistic" class solidarity is a different sort of bounded solidarity than that instantiated in the welfare state. solidarity as the explanation for inclusive politics. Here again, inclusive outcomes can arise without pre-existing societal solidarity.
Indeed it is interesting to note that the left itself originally disavowed appeals to national solidarity in their political struggles for political and social rights. Socialist parties initially understood themselves as class parties engaged in class struggle, drawing upon class solidarity to defeat their class enemies. But the breakthrough for social democracy arguably occurred when they abandoned this selfconception, and redescribed themselves as a "people's party" representing the nation as a whole and appealing to solidarity amongst co-nationals as a basis for social justice. As Sheri Berman notes, this transition from class solidarity to national solidarity was bitterly contested on the left in many European countries, in part due to the lingering influence of Marxism and its doctrine that all history is the history of class struggle (Berman 2006) . But the idea of the welfare state as an expression of an ethic of nationhood -captured so evocatively in Per Albin Hansson's idea of a "people's home" (folkhemmet), or in T.H. Marshall's claim that the welfare state rests on "a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation that is a common possession" (Marshall 1950: 96) --proved to be politically more effective.
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Note how the welfare state here is tied to an image of social membership, not universal humanitarianism. The assumption, for both the Swedish Social Democrats and the British Labour party, is that we form a community, and that the function of the welfare state is to ensure that everyone feels equally at home in the community, that everyone can equally partake in the cultural life of the community and enjoy its civilization, and that everyone can feel that they belong to the community and that the community belongs to them. It is this vision of the welfare state as an expression of national solidarity -and not just of class struggle or of universal humanitarianism -that powerfully inspired social democratic politics. On this view, a sense of common identity and solidarity was needed before encompassing institutions and policies could be established.
This contrast between solidaristic and strategic approaches is a recurrent theme throughout the volume. But any plausible account is likely to combine them in various ways. Indeed, Baldwin argues that although the historical development of the welfare state was powerfully driven by the politics of self-interest, more redistributive welfare states, such as those that emerged in Scandinavia, also required a strong sense of collective identity and solidarity (Baldwin 1990 ). Moreover, the power resource approach can be seen, not as denying the long-term importance of solidarity, but rather as an account of its origins. Inclusive welfare states or expanded enfranchisement may have initially arisen as a result of strategic behaviour by actors motivated by partisan or particularistic interests, but these reforms set in motion an evolutionary process which over time contributed to a more comprehensive sense of solidarity. As Thelen puts it, commenting on the historical development of the famous German training system, "these institutions were not designed to promote equality"; rather "their solidarity-enhancing side effects grew as the system expanded in scope" to become "a national model to which virtually all youth had access" (2014: 10). Whatever their origins, however, these reforms created new conceptions of the nature and boundaries of social membership, of both who belongs to the nation, and what are rights of membership. Indeed, in some cases, these attitudes became embedded in the national identity of the country. The chapters by Peter Hall and Irene Bloemraad discuss how inclusive reforms can emerge through political conflict and later become incorporated into broader "collective imaginaries" in ways that help to stabilize them.
On this view, the "direct sense of community membership" which Marshall viewed as underpinning the welfare state may actually be the outcome of it. Moreover, this sense of mutual support should be seen not simply as an epiphenomenon, but as helping to secure and sustain these reforms over time as the initial strategic coalitions that built them begin to weaken. After all, the 12 See also historian Ben Jackson's observation that historically successful appeals for egalitarian politicians in the USA and the UK tended to be expressed in the idiom of national solidarity, and that "redistribution expressed the fairness and solidarity of the national character" (Jackson 2009: 239). power of trade unions and social democratic parties has weakened at various times and places, yet welfare states persist, arguably because they helped to build the very feelings of national solidarity needed to sustain them.
13 Solidarity may not be the cause of the initial building of inclusive institutions, but it may be one of the effects of these reforms, and moreover an effect that works to sustain the reforms over time in the face of new challenges and new constellations of bargaining power.
Yet solidarity is not always a "side-effect" of inclusive reforms. This may have been the case of the original German training system, but it seems clear that in other cases -Sweden paradigmaticallythe Social Democrats defined themselves as "people's party" at an early stage and quite deliberately used social policy to strengthen national solidarity, which they hoped could then be leveraged to promote yet further reforms. If at times Marshall's picture seems to suggest that inclusive politics arises bottom-up from the mobilization of feelings of shared membership, other commentators offer a more "top-down" or "from above" analysis, viewing these feelings of shared membership as themselves the (intended) outcome of elite-driven reform. The chapter by Karin Borevi illustrates how Danish and Swedish elites differ on precisely this issue of the sources of solidarity. Danish elites typically adopt a "society-centred" approach which assumes that social cohesion amongst the people in civil society is a precondition to build or sustain the welfare state; Swedish elites typically adopt a "state-centred" approach which assumes that the welfare state generates social trust -a difference she argues is rooted in their different histories of nation-state building.
This suggests that the linkages between strategic and solidaristic accounts are complex and multilayered. Successful efforts to create more inclusive democracies and more redistributive welfare states are typically contested, rarely the result of any pre-existing feelings of enhanced solidarity, and so depend on the contingent balance of power resources. Yet these reforms can over time create feelings of national solidarity which help to secure them against the vagaries of power politics, as they become seen as common possessions or achievements of the nation, and not just the spoils of partisan battles. In the end, there is likely to be an interaction between the two processes, as T.H. Marshall himself concluded in his discussion of the emergence of social rights in British experience. The growth of a common consciousness was, in his view, "stimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won " (1950: 96) .
So this leads to our first set of propositions: Solidarity refers to attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and support in time of need. In the contemporary context of increasingly diverse societies, we are interested in a solidarity that transcends ethno-religious differences, operates at a societal scale, and has civic, democratic and redistributive dimensions. Such an inclusive solidarity, we contend, is needed to sustain just institutions. Just institutions cannot be built or sustained solely through strategic behaviour and partisan contestation, or through unbounded humanitarianism.
Is solidarity in decline and is diversity to blame?
We assume that, today, solidarity is fragile at best, and at worst eroding, and so needs to be actively shored up. This seems to be indicated by growing inequality, support for parties that cut taxes for the well-off while cutting benefits for the poor, support for parties that scapegoat minorities, or hardening attitudes towards recipients of state support, and so on.
This assumption of declining solidarity seems to be almost universally endorsed by both public pundits and academic writing, but it is worth asking how well-supported this assumption is. One might speculate with Joseph Schumpeter that "attitudes are coins that do not readily melt", and that feelings of solidarity change slowly, perhaps even only intergenerationally.
14 For example, several studies suggest that attitudes to the role of the state in reducing inequalities and ensuring equal opportunities have been remarkably stable before, during, and after the heyday of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. 15 This period witnessed significant changes in the strategic balance of power held by various political actors, but not it seems in underlying public attitudes.
If we dig a bit deeper, however, there is evidence of more subtle changes in attitudes of solidarity. Cavaille and Trump (2015) argue that, at least in the British case, while there has been little change in public support for the general principle that the state should reduce inequality (what they call "redistribution from"), there has been a hardening of attitudes towards specific recipients (what they call "redistribution to"), including the unemployed, single mothers and immigrants. Put more colloquially, it seems that the public continues to think that the rich do not deserve their good fortune, and so should be taxed, but have started to believe that perhaps the disadvantaged do deserve their bad fortune, and so are less keen to support them. 16 What explains this hardening of attitudes to the recipients of welfare? Commentators typically refer to "deservingness" judgements, which include judgements about the extent to which someone's misfortune or disadvantage was under their voluntary control. But the evidence suggests that deservingness judgements also track other criteria, including "identity" (the extent to which recipients are seen as belonging to a shared society), "attitude" (the extent to which recipients are seen as being grateful); and "reciprocity" (the extent to which recipients are seen as likely to help others when it is their turn to do so).
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The relevance of these criteria should not be surprising if, as argued earlier, the welfare state is not primarily about either class struggle or universal humanitarianism, but rather about an ethic of social membership. Judgements of identity, attitude and reciprocity are all different dimensions of the idea that the welfare state embodies Marshall's "direct sense of community membership". It is also perhaps not surprising that these criteria work to the detriment of immigrants. While several recipient groups are burdened by deservingness judgements, immigrants in Europe invariably come out at the bottom of the ranking of deservingness. Van Oorschot indeed calls this "a truly universal element in the popular welfare culture of present Western welfare states " (2006: 25) . This is arguably a key factor in explaining the rise of welfare chauvinism, at the expense of a more inclusive solidarity.
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This leads to our second proposition: Solidarity is eroding, at least along certain dimensions, although not as dramatically or comprehensively as widely assumed. Solidarity seems to change slowly, perhaps over generations.
If solidarity is eroding, is increasing diversity a key factor in this decline? Clearly it is not the only factor at work. In the 1950s, well before the mobilization of historic national minorities and the dramatic rise in immigration, commentators were already speculating that long-term trends in Western capitalist societies, such as the rise of possessive individualism and consumerism, were eroding solidarity in favour of egoism or apathy.
19 These concerns were revived with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, and further exacerbated by globalization, which seemed to diminish the importance of 14 Schumpeter as quoted in Svallors 2010: 241. 15 For arguments about the stability of attitudes of solidarity, see Brooks and Manza 2007; Cavaille and Trump 2015. 16 See also McCall 2013 on public opinion regarding the undeserving rich. 17 For a review of these findings, see van Oorschot 2006. 18 As van Oorschot notes, deservingness judgements are essentially the flip side of feelings of solidarity: "In fact, one could argue that the difference between both concepts is more a matter of disciplinary origin and context, with `solidarity' having a tradition in sociology, and `deservingness' having its roots in social psychology " (2005: 10n3) . 19 For renewed discussions of the general societal trend towards "individualization", and its impact on the prospects for solidarity, see Genov 2015 , Edsall 2015 national boundaries. All of these trends and forces would be reshaping solidarity even if there were no change in the levels or composition of ethnic, racial and religious diversity in a society. So diversity is not the only threat to solidarity.
Nonetheless, ethnic, racial, and religious diversity clearly has the capacity to weaken the bonds of solidarity. Insofar as just institutions are built on ideas of bounded solidarity, they require citizens to view themselves as an ethical community bound together by distinctive obligations to each other. As we have seen, this feeling has typically been grounded in a sense of shared nationhood, or Marshall's national consciousness, or a certain collective imaginary -a "story of peoplehood" (Smith 2003) . It seems plausible that increasing diversity might make it harder to sustain this sense of shared identity. But one needs to be careful here. A small industry has arisen trying to test the impact of diversity on various dimensions of solidarity or social cohesion, and the empirical evidence to date suggests that if diversity does have a negative impact on solidarity, it is far from inherent or universal. For example, a recent survey of 464 articles found that "there are nearly as many studies rejecting the negative effects of diversity as arguing for them" (Schaeffer, 2014: 4) . Similarly, a meta-analysis of 90 articles found that 26 studies identified a negative impact, 25 studies did not, and 39 studies provide mixed or neutral evidence (Van de Meer and Tolsma 2014) . And a third review of the literature adds that the effects, whether positive or negative, seem to be small (Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2013 ; see also Portes and Vickstrom 2011; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005) . In the words of two leading scholars "the debate about the consequences of ethnic diversity on social cohesion has reached a stalemate" (Stolle and Harell, 2015: 117) .
This suggests that rather than looking for universal patterns regarding the impact of diversity on solidarity, we need to ask more fine-grained questions about how specific dimensions of diversity affect specific types of collective identities, under specific political conditions. For example, as we discuss in greater detail below, different forms of national identity are more or less open to diversity. The tension is greatest in the context of traditional ideas of nationhood, reflecting an amalgam of a common racial/ethnic descent, common religion, common language, common history, common territory, common lifestyles --a "blood and soil" nationhood which is especially likely to exclude immigrants and ethnic minorities. Other stories of peoplehood may be more open to diversity.
But these stories of peoplehood are not static or self-enacting: they are always told and retold by particular social actors. And this points to the importance of political agency, especially the role of the media and political elites in shaping the relationship between diversity and solidarity. We noted earlier that political actors can sometimes have electoral reasons for reaching out to minorities, but all too often political actors choose to prime and mobilize divisions between the majority population on one hand and both newcomers and historic minorities on the other. Although public attitudes tend to change slowly, the political mobilization of anti-minority sentiment has considerable flash potentialthe capacity to erupt quickly and overturn existing policy regimes. This process is described in detail in Edward Koning's chapter on the rise of anti-immigrant parties in the Netherlands. He suggests that these parties have not had a substantial impact on public attitudes towards immigrants, but they have made attitudes towards immigration more politically salient in ways that produce welfare chauvinism and erode inclusive politics. The chapter by Zoe Lefkofridi and Elie Michel extends this analysis to anti-immigrant parties throughout Europe, exploring how they have (re)positioned themselves as champions of solidarity, albeit an exclusive form of solidarity that defines immigrants not only as undeserving, but as threats to the welfare state.
So the tension between diversity and solidarity is mediated by the nature of national identities and the strategies of political actors. Different forms of diversity may also play a quite different role. Some scholars, drawing primarily on the American experience, argue that racialized difference is more corrosive of solidarity than ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity. Others argue that religious diversity is the greater threat, since it raises the prospect of deep conflicts in core political values (e.g., over secularism or women's rights), and indeed even "civilizational" differences. Similar debates arise about whether the bigger threat to solidarity comes from the growth of "new minorities" created through immigration, or from the presence of long-standing ethnonational groups and indigenous peoples (e.g., between whites and indigenous peoples; or between French and English in Canada; or between whites and blacks in the US).
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A related issue concerns the timing or sequencing of increased diversity. There is considerable difference between the American experience of racial diversity constraining the development of a welfare state from its very beginning, and European countries coming to terms with new forms of diversity in the context of mature welfare states which are well embedded in national cultures and voters' expectations. European welfare states may therefore be less vulnerable to diversity effects, and more able to include newcomers, particularly if -as we discuss below -welfare states can help to build the very solidarities they require (Crepaz 2008; Taylor-Gooby 2005) . This suggests not only that different forms of diversity raise different challenges, but also that a society's ability to address those challenges will depend on its pre-existing matrix of collective identities, political opportunity structures, and institutionalized policy regimes.
If diversity poses a threat to solidarity, does it pose different challenges to our three dimensions of solidarity? Some commentators argue that it is a feature of a neoliberal era that they start to diverge, and that a certain kind of civic tolerance, non-discrimination and even superficial multicultural recognition of diversity may increase even as space for democratic contestation and redistribution are eroded. (Similar claims have been made regarding gay rights under neoliberalism). This is sometimes called "neoliberal multiculturalism", or more pejoratively, "boutique multiculturalism" or "Benetton multiculturalism". 21 In reaction to this neoliberal multiculturalism, traditional defenders of the welfare state may mobilize to defend redistributive solidarity, yet do so in a way that excludes newcomers from its benefits, often justified on the basis of xenophobic rhetoric about the cultural and political threat posed by certain minorities. This is often called "welfare chauvinism", left populism or left authoritarianism. In some countries, these seem to be the two main choices on offer: a neoliberal multiculturalism that secures civic solidarity at the price of the hollowing out of democracy and redistribution, and a welfare chauvinism that secures redistributive solidarity at the price of civic solidarity towards minorities and newcomers. 22 As we shall see below, this possibility that civic and redistributive solidarity are diverging is explored in depth in the chapter by Celine Teney and Marc Helbling, on public and elite opinion in Germany, and the chapter by Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot, on attitudes to social citizenship across Europe.
For those who seek to secure and promote all three forms of solidarity, in what we might call a democratic multicultural welfare state, we need to think carefully about each distinct dimension of solidarity, rather than assuming they stand or fall together. This leads to our third set of propositions: While diversity has an independent effect on solidarity, above and beyond other contemporary social and economic trends, the relationship between diversity and solidarity is complex and context-dependent. Different types of diversity seem to affect solidarity in different ways; and diversity has distinct effects on three dimensions of solidarity. Civic tolerance and redistributive solidarity in particular may follow different trajectories in a neoliberal age. 20 In his review of 472 studies from around the world of the impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion, Schaeffer notes that a negative impact is more likely to be found in the context of historic racial/national/indigenous minorities than in the context of immigrants (2014: 24). For similar findings in Canada, see Banting 2007, and Koning 2013. 21 For influential discussions of neoliberal multiculturalism, see Hale 2005; Zizek 1997 , and the overview in Kymlicka 2013. 22 On left authoritarianism, see Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann 2013. What are the political sources of solidarity?
The evidence reviewed so far suggests that whether diversity erodes solidarity is not predetermined, but is ultimately a matter of politics. While not the only factors mediating the relationship between diversity and solidarity, the presence of solidaristic political discourses and identities matters, as do the actions of political agents who seek to reinforce solidarity in daily political life, and the design of key public institutions and policy regimes, including the welfare state, rights regimes and citizenship/integration regimes. Moreover, some of these political factors may be more subject to conscious redesign than other factors. It is here that we are most likely to find the policy levers that we can use to sustain and promote solidarity.
As noted earlier, we distinguish three broad categories of political sources of solidarity, which we refer to in shorthand as "political community", "political agents", and "political institutions and policy regimes".
Political Community:
The question of how to sustain solidarity within a liberal democracy has been a dilemma for contemporary political theorists, in part because the very principles of liberal democracy contradict and delegitimize older models of national solidarity based on shared ancestry and religion. At the dawn of liberal democracy, in 1787, it was still possible for John Jay to say of the United States that "Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people -a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manner and customs" (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 2008: 7) . But today, we are likely to recoil at the idea that solidarity can be based on shared ancestry and religion, and to view this as a slippery slope to racial exclusion, ethnic cleansing, even genocide. 23 With the spread of human rights norms and liberaldemocratic values in the post-war period, we need to find new sources of solidarity that do not rely on such thick cultural ties.
For most contemporary liberal democratic theorists, the solution is to distinguish thicker prepolitical cultural traits (like religion and ancestry) from a thinner and more strictly political culture, rooted in liberal-democratic values and practices themselves. The fact that human rights norms have delegitimated long-standing models of national solidarity suggests that political values can be powerful forces in modern society, and raises the possibility that these values can themselves provide the new basis for solidarity. Can solidarity amongst people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds be built simply on the basis of a shared commitment to human rights and democracy, without any thicker pre-political "cultural glue"? This idea has been the focus of a lively debate in contemporary political theory, and has arguably shaped recent government policies in several countries. However, there are several different versions of this view, and also several different labels for it. Some writers use the label of "civic nationalism" for this view, contrasted with earlier forms of "ethnic nationalism" that appeal to pre-political cultural traits. But other authors argue that this view is best seen, not as an alternative form of nationalism, but as an alternative to nationalism -as a form of "post-nationalism" that breaks decisively with core ideas of nationalism. These authors often prefer the language of "constitutional patriotism" to that of "civic nationalism". Beneath these semantic disagreements over labels are deeper disagreements about the basis for feelings of shared membership and mutual obligation within a political community. To oversimplify, we might distinguish three such accounts:
Liberal value consensus: According to the American liberal political philosopher John Rawls, a shared belief in the principles of liberal-democratic justice is sufficient to ensure solidarity. On this 23 And of course Jay's conception of nationhood helped make possible the ethnic cleansing of American Indians.
view, people act with solidarity because duties of justice are part of their rationally-held beliefs about the appropriate principles of a liberal-democratic political order. As he puts it, "Although a wellordered society is divided and pluralistic…public agreement on questions of political and social justice support ties of civic friendship and secures the bonds of association" (Rawls 1980: 540) . It is important to emphasize that for Rawls agreement is only required on political values -the rules of the political game -not on more personal questions about the good life, such as religious beliefs, sexual orientations, or cultural practices. This is an attractive proposal. However, this account fails to explain the bounded nature of solidarity. The principles of liberal-democratic justice, on Rawls's own account, are not distinctive to any particular country. All countries -at least all Western democracies -are assumed to share essentially the same set of political principles (human rights, democratic procedures, rule of law, protecting the vulnerable etc). These values are "nationally anonymous", in Joppke's phrase (Joppke 2004: 253) , and indeed are seen by most citizens as universal values that all societies should uphold. But how can adherence to universal principles explain bounded solidarity? Why should we feel more solidarity towards our co-citizens than to other people across the border or around the world who also share our liberal-democratic values? Indeed, why should we care about our country as such at all? For example, why should we try to keep our country together as a single polity, rather than breaking it into smaller units, or merging it into another country, if such reconstituted states would respect standard human rights and democracy measures? In short, there is a logical gap between a cognitive belief in universal values and a felt solidarity with a bounded "we".
Constitutional Patriotism: One way to close this gap is to say that bounded solidarity emerges not just from a cognitive belief in liberal-democratic justice, but also from our active participation in collective liberal-democratic decision-making processes. The underlying values may be nationally anonymous, but the decision-making processes are nation-specific. And by participating in the process, we come to have a stronger sense of identification with our particular country and our cocitizens. This is the idea that Habermas has labeled "constitutional patriotism", to emphasize that our patriotic attachment is not just to universal values, but also to the specific way they are codified within particular constitutions. This idea can be given a more specifically republican interpretation. Republicans say that through engagement in liberal-democratic procedures, we come to see ourselves as "co-authors" of our own laws and institutions, and hence see the political order as an expression of our collective will. It may be that the underlying values we attempt to pursue in our collective institutions are nationally anonymous, but the very process of collectively pursuing them develops a nationally-specific sense of collective ownership and collective identity that includes all (and only) our co-authors. On this model of solidarity, a solidaristic collective identity emerges from a combination of (nationally-anonymous) shared liberal-democratic values and (nationallyspecific) political participation. As Habermas puts it, political identity is not derived "from some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights" (1992: 3), and this praxis "forms the ultimate medium for a form of abstract, legally constructed solidarity that reproduces itself through political participation" (2001: 76). 24 24 Some theorists would drop the requirement of shared liberal values. For these "agonistic" theorists, it is participation itself that generates a sense of co-authorship of political life, and this can encompass citizens who differ greatly not only in their personal conceptions of the good, but also in their fundamental political values. Indeed, on this model -known variously as a radical democratic, contestatory or agonistic model, associated with Chantal Mouffe (2000) and William Connolly (1991) -we should encourage the contesting of liberal-democratic values. To exclude non-liberal views is to silence dissent and impose a false orthodoxy. Defenders of this model argue that insofar as Rawlsian or Habermasian approaches allow liberal political institutions to determine the permissibility of minority practices unilaterally and in sectarian terms, the effect is to further marginalize the groups involved.
This solidarity-through-participation argument faces a number of objections. 25 In modern largescale democracies, most individuals have no direct experience of ruling, and the likelihood that any individuals' vote or voice will make a difference is negligible. If citizens did not already feel a strong sense of belonging or attachment to a particular political community, the mere act of participation, in the modest forms available to modern citizens, is unlikely to generate a strong sense of co-authorship or co-ownership. And indeed the evidence to date suggests that participation by itself is not consistently associated with increased solidarity.
More importantly, these accounts arguably get the causal arrow backwards. On the Rawlsian and Habermasian accounts, collective national identities are an outcome or by-product of shared values and public participation. On their view, citizens conceive themselves as a nation only because and insofar as they are co-authors of a constitutional order that enacts universal liberal-democratic values. But this is backwards, at least from a historical perspective. In most cases, a common national identity emerged within a core ethnic group before the society developed into a liberal-democratic constitutional order. The English, Danes, Dutch, Czechs, Germans and Portuguese viewed themselves as nations even when they were ruled by monarchs or aristocrats under constitutional orders that were neither liberal nor democratic. These societies have now established liberal-democracies, but they viewed themselves as co-nationals before they were co-authors of a liberal-democratic order. Indeed, they often demanded democracy in the name of their (pre-existing) nation, as a form of national liberation or national self-determination or national advancement. The nation preceded the democratic order.
Some people have even argued that the transition to liberal-democracy is only possible where such a pre-existing national identity exists (Canovan 1996) . A pre-existing sense of nationhood provides the trust, solidarity, and mutual understanding needed to sustain a liberal democracy. As Mill famously put it, genuine democracy is "next to impossible" without a sense of nationhood because "the united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot exist" (Mill 1972: 392) .
We can call this the nationalist approach to solidarity: build the nation, and liberal-democratic solidarity will (or may) emerge. Rawls and Habermas are aware of this nationalist option, and acknowledge that it reflects the actual history of most Western democracies, which were national before they were liberal-democratic. Indeed, Habermas acknowledges that to date this nationalist approach has provided the only viable route to developing liberal democracies. As he puts it, "Only a national consciousness, crystallised around the notion of a common ancestry, language and history, only the consciousness of belonging to `the same' people, makes subjects into citizens of a single political community, into members who can feel responsible for one another" (1999: 113).
However, he insists that this approach is no longer viable or acceptable. Since the nationalist approach presupposes that we can generate a common national identity prior to democratic participation, national identity must be based on what he calls "pre-political" sources of unity, such as a common language, ethnic descent, traditional ways of life, religion, and attachment to a traditional territory or homeland. Such pre-political ideas of nationhood, he argues, are inherently exclusionary, particularly of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Pre-political nationhood is "blood and soil" nationhood, or "ethnic nationalism", and so cannot encompass the claims of people who do not share the same language, descent, historical territory, or religion (1999: 111).
In short, while pre-political nationhood was historically a "catalyst" for democracy, now it has become "superfluous" (Habermas 2001: 73) , and we need to find a thinner "post-national" conception of solidarity -one that eschews ideas of pre-political nationhood, and instead defines national identity solely in terms of universal values and democratic participation.
We seem then to be stuck between two opposite positions. The Rawls/Habermas view based on shared adherence to universal political principles is attractively thin, and hence inclusive, but may be unable to stabilize or motivate bounded solidarities. The traditional nationalist approach is much thicker, and historically effective in developing bounded solidarities, but it is too thick, since it excludes all those who do not share the history, language and culture of the dominant national group.
Liberal Nationalism: Is there another option? Some theorists, known as liberal nationalists, argue that the nationalist approach can be thinned in order to make it more inclusive, without losing its motivational efficacy. On this view, it is important for political communities to continue to promote a kind of pre-political sense of nationhood. For liberal nationalists, such as Yael Tamir and David Miller, it is important that citizens do not simply view themselves as a group of individuals who happen to find themselves in a single state and who now co-author their own democratic laws. 26 Rather, they should think of themselves as belonging together in a single state because they are the current members of an inter-generational national community that has a long history, one that often extends back beyond the emergence of liberal-democratic constitutional order. This inter-generational national community has a history of living together on its territory, reflected in its national language, institutions and patrimony, and the state is a vehicle by which this historically-constituted people exercises self-government. Liberal nationalists argue that this sense of belonging together is needed to secure political stability and solidarity. 27 However, as we all know, relying on nationhood to build liberal-democratic stability and solidarity creates endemic risks for all those who are not seen as belonging to the nation, including indigenous peoples, substate national groups and immigrants. Since they are not seen as members of the nation or people in whose name the state governs, and may indeed be seen as potentially disloyal fifth columns, they are often not trusted to govern themselves or to share in the governing of the larger society. And this exclusion is typically then buttressed and justified by ideologies of racial inferiority or cultural backwardness. In short, while liberal democracy has benefitted in important ways from its link with nationhood, minorities have often paid a high price. They have been faced with social stigmatization and racialization, at best offered a stark choice of assimilation or exclusion, and at worst subject to expulsion or genocide.
Liberal nationalists try to square this circle in two ways. First, in order to ensure that such prepolitical ideas of nationhood are not exclusionary, they need to be "thinned" to make room for ethnic and religious diversity. Traditional pre-political ideas of nationhood often invoked an amalgam of (alleged) commonalities, such as common religion, common racial/ethnic descent, common language, common history, common territory, and common lifestyles. According to liberal nationalists, some of these are inherently exclusionary of immigrants and ethnic minorities, but not all of them. Requiring shared blood is exclusionary of immigrants, but requiring a shared language may not be. Requiring a shared religion is exclusionary, but requiring some knowledge of national history may not be. Requiring a shared "ethnic culture" in the sense of traditional customs, cuisines, dress, and lifestyles is exclusionary, but promoting a common "public culture" (reflected in public national media, museums, symbols) may not be. And so on. The goal, in short, is to draw upon the idea that nations are historic communities which rightly belong together in distinct political communities that govern national territories, but to redefine the character of these nations to make them more open and inclusive.
Some liberal nationalists would go further, and argue that any legitimate form of liberal nationalism must be supplemented and constrained by multiculturalism. It is not enough to thin national identities, one must also give public recognition to ethnocultural diversity within a shared 26 For statements of this liberal nationalist position, see Tamir 1993 , Miller 1995 , Moore 2001 Our focus in this volume is on solidarity, but a central plank in the liberal nationalist position is that nationhood also helps to stabilize political boundaries, since a commitment to democracy on its own underdetermines the relevant units and boundaries (Canovan 1996) . national identity and narrative. The idea of "multicultural nationalism" is an oxymoron on traditional accounts of ethnic nationalism, but is arguably consistent with liberal nationalism, and may be needed to ensure that the privileging of national identity does not come at the expense of minorities.
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On our view, some version of a thinned and multicultural liberal nationalism remains a viable and important political source of solidarity in the contemporary world. However, this account too faces important objections, and many of the chapters in our volume attempt to probe its strengths and limitations.
Empirical studies: These different models of political community have been intensely debated within the field of political theory, but this debate has been surprisingly disconnected from social science research. As mentioned earlier, one of our aims with this volume is to bridge these fields, and to see if we can empirically evaluate some of the arguments advanced by political theorists. This is easier said than done, since the tools of empirical analysis often seen rather blunt in comparison with the subtleties of theoretical debates. The distinction between `political' and `pre-political' sources of national identity may seem clear and important to political theorists, but may be more difficult to disentangle and to measure in empirical research. Similarly, there is no single or simple metric to measure how `thick' or `thin' national identities are. It is not easy to translate these theoretical visions into testable empirical hypotheses.
Nevertheless, important work has been done to start filling this gap, and the findings are important, providing both encouragement and substantial qualification. Some studies have tested the Rawlsian idea that solidarity can be based on a shared commitment to universal (nationally-anonymous) basic liberal-democratic values. We noted earlier the concern that this idea seems unable to explain the bounded nature of solidarity, and the empirical findings seem to confirm this, although with an interesting twist. Drawing on European survey data, the chapter by Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorshot in this volume concludes that strong supporters of civil and political rights tend to be much more tolerant of newcomers. So strong commitment to these basic civil and political rights does seem to readily extend to outsiders. Redistributive solidarity, however, appears to be more bounded, and whether it is inclusive or exclusive of newcomers is more contingent. Interestingly, whether a commitment to redistributive solidarity extends to newcomers depends on the extent to which people feel their social rights are in fact already protected in their society: respondents with strong but unfulfilled aspirations for social rights tend to have more exclusionary attitudes towards newcomers, while their counterparts who feel social rights are being provided are more likely to express tolerance. 29 Drawing on new data from North America, the chapter by Richard Johnston and his colleagues also finds that a commitment to basic civil and political rights can have inclusionary effects, including boosting support for redistributive solidarity, but that the effect varies across political contexts. It is especially marked in the United States, reflecting the place of equality rights in that country's national narrative. In short, a shared commitment to universal liberal-democratic values can sustain some forms of solidarity, in some contexts, but in variable and contingent ways.
In contrast, empirical studies of the emphasis on political participation in theories of constitutional patriotism is less supportive. The evidence suggests that while participation increases a person's political skills, knowledge and sense of efficacy, it does not increase their solidarity in ways that constitutional patriots hope (Segall 2005; Mansbridge 2003) . Not surprisingly perhaps, it is the claims of liberal nationalists that have attracted the most intensive empirical testing, especially the proposition that liberal nationalism can enhance support for redistribution. We noted earlier the concern that appealing to a sense of shared nationhood might be effective at promoting redistributive solidarity for national insiders, but at the expense of excluding minorities and immigrants. Interestingly, the results to date suggest that both the benefits and the risks might be overstated. 31 In their contribution to this volume, Teney and Hebling draw on an innovative survey of the strength of cosmopolitan versus national identities among elites and masses in Germany, and conclude that strength of national identity is largely irrelevant: differences in redistributive solidarity between elites and masses are driven by different material interests rather than different degrees of national or postnational identities. Loobucyk and Sinardet argue that while liberal nationalism may work well in some countries, it is difficult to apply in states such as Belgium which contain two or more ethnonational groups claiming the right to govern themselves and their national territory. Similarly, Baubock emphasizes that while liberal nationalism can work well to support solidarity at the level of the nation-state, in a globalized world of multi-level governance we need to find sources of solidarity above and below the level of the nation, based on different principles of membership.
However, the chapter that focuses most directly on the liberal nationalism thesis comes to complex conclusions. In line with liberal nationalist predictions, Johnston and his colleagues find that thin national identity (as measured by simple national pride) is much less exclusionary than thicker or more ascriptive forms of national identity (which celebrate being born in the country, having ancestors in the country, and being Christian). However, whether national pride supports redistributive solidarity varies across political systems. In the case of Quebec, for example, national pride is positively associated with support for redistribution, but that this reflects distinctive features of the local national narrative, rather than any inherently solidaristic tendency of national identity as such. Indeed, the authors conclude in the end that a strong sense of national identity often weakens solidarity, but its effects depend on which aspects of identity are triggered. 32 This plasticity in the role of national pride suggests that the relationship between identity and solidarity is potentially amenable to cultural engineering by the state, an issue we revisit below.
Finally, the chapter by Peter Hall argues that while liberal nationalists may be right to emphasize the need for bounded solidarity and a sense of community, this shouldn't be reduced to national identity in any simple sense. He agrees that feelings of mutual obligation are important, but are rooted in wider "collective imaginaries" that contain not only ideas about who belongs, but also foundational myths, historical memories, and shared moral understandings. As we shall see below, such collective understandings structure the discursive opportunities available to political agents seeking to advance political claims in each country. Hall argues that broadening our understanding of political community beyond identity requires reframing traditional questions about the potentially corrosive effects of diversity.
The empirical evidence is important, requiring at a minimum considerable nuancing of the liberal nationalist approach. Whatever the link between national identity and solidarity, it is clearly not monotonic or lock-step, and probably not conscious or direct. Indeed, we might think that nationhood works best when it is deep in the background, as a taken-for-granted presupposition of social life. For when nationhood is highlighted or primed -when it is taken from the back of people's minds to the 31 Shayo (2009) provides the most negative evidence, concluding that a strong sense of national identity -at both the individual and societal levels -is corrosive of solidarity in western nations. But as Miller and Ali 2014 note in their review of the literature, most studies find more modest and more ambivalent effects. For U.S. evidence, see Theiss-Morse 2009. 32 In their paper, Johnston et al are focusing on how different survey questions in social science research can "trigger" these different aspects of national identity, but as they imply, this ability to trigger different aspects of identity is also available to political actors in real-world public debates. front of their minds -it can trigger xenophobia. This is one of the results of what are called "mere mention" experiments. In these experiments, one group of respondents is asked "do you believe immigrants deserve X". Another group of people are asked the same question, but with a national prime: they are asked: "You are Dutch: do you believe immigrants deserve X". The "mere mention" of nationhood produces harsher answers in the Netherlands (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) , although not in Canada (Breton 2012) . The chapter by Johnston and his colleagues adds that the culture of every country contains both thinner and thicker forms of nationalism, and the impact depends heavily on which dimensions of national sentiment are primed by political agents. This is a salutary reminder of the importance of political agency, to which we turn next.
In summary, bounded solidarity seems inextricably linked to an ethic of shared social membership, and in the contemporary world of nation-states, nationhood is the default boundary of social membership. The task, then, is to think about ways of managing diversity that upholds an ethic of membership without triggering the kinds of exclusionary reflexes that too often characterize conscious affirmations of nationalism. The challenge is to frame the recognition and accommodation of diversity, not as a threat to or deviation from an ethic of social membership, but as a contribution to it. We will return to this question below, in our discussion of the role of public policies. 
Political agents
As we have seen, historic forms of solidarity have become embedded in national identities, collective imaginaries and shared understandings, helping them to persist after the original coalitions of support have faded away. But such path dependency does not last forever. Attitudes of mutual support may change slowly, but they are not immutable and need continuous reinforcement. Moreover, as societies become more diverse, historic forms of solidarity need to be stretched to incorporate newcomers. Building an inclusive solidarity is a daily task. Which political agents are today's bearers of the idea of an inclusive solidarity? Who are the advocates seeking to reinforce solidaristic attitudes in political debates and to institutionalize them in party programs and public policies? 33 The advocates and coalitions that nurture social solidarity today are likely to differ from earlier historical periods. As we noted, trade unions and social democratic parties played a vital political role in introducing social programs and nurturing the solidaristic attitudes which could sustain them over time. However, these historic coalitions are shadows of their former selves. In many countries, trade unions have been weakened and are increasingly divided; and party systems have restructured, with a growing divide between social democratic parties and their traditional constituencies (Kriesi et al.2012) . Another historic bearer of a message of solidarity were Christian Democratic parties and allied religious lay movements, which were influenced by Catholic social doctrine, with its emphasis on social integration, class reconciliation and solidarity between groups (van Kersbergen 1995; van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Here again, a historic champion plays a more limited role today.
So who might be the new champions of inclusive solidarity? Some commentators have hoped that new social movements -such as feminist, gay, multiculturalist or environmental movements -can 33 On the importance of "carriers" of ideas into politics and the subsequent institutionalization of ideas, see Berman 1998, ch. 2; and Hall 1986, 1993. serve as the new bearers of solidarity. Stjernø expresses doubts about this idea, arguing that these social movements define boundaries between themselves and external adversaries -a clear distinction between us and them -and so are unlikely to contribute to an inclusive sense of identity and solidarity at the macro level (Stjernø 2005) . But in fact there is considerable evidence that coalitions of progressive groups have been able to advocate effectively for more inclusive solidarity. In thinking about these potential coalitions, it is important to distinguish between immigration policy (ie., who gets admitted) and integration policy (ie., how immigrants are integrated into society once they have arrived). For example, business interests tend to support immigration (Menz 2013; Freeman 1995) , but seem to be less engaged in advancing programs to ensure the subsequent incorporation of newcomers in the civic and political life of the country. Labour unions, in comparison, have stronger incentives to support the integration of migrants into the social and political protections. In many countries, unions have shifted away from their nativist stances of the early twentieth century, and have come to see exclusionary integration policies not only as inconsistent with human rights but also as barriers to the organization of immigrant workers (Haus 2002) . Unions regularly join with churches, human rights organizations, and other liberal civil society organizations to support migrant rights. This suggests that the potential for a `rainbow coalition' of social movements and civil society organizations in defense of inclusive solidarity is more likely in relation to integration policy than the more intensely contested field of immigration policy -and this is indeed what the empirical evidence shows (Koopmans et al 2005) .
Moreover, these social movements and civil society organizations have not just advocated for more inclusive policies, but have also championed more inclusive identities and narratives -Hall's "collective imaginaries". Political altruists who support immigrants also articulate an understanding of national identity and citizenship that is more inclusive of diversity: "Instead of seeing the cultural differences brought by immigration as a threat to national cohesion and identity, pro-migrant and antiracist activists define the nation as an open and universal sphere" (Koopmans et al 2005: 207 ; also Giugni and Passy 2001) . While these collective imaginaries of inclusive citizenship differ across countries -for example, antiracist discourse is more prominent in France whereas support for multicultural recognition is more common in Britain -but the common thread is a more civic understanding of citizenship in diverse societies.
However, it is far from clear that mobilization by new social movements and civil society organizations is a sufficient or sustainable basis for inclusive solidarity. In fact, the growing politicization of immigration policy has tended to dilute the impact of such civil society mobilization. The successes of populist anti-immigrant parties have shifted immigrant from low politics to high politics, and disrupted the quiet bureaucratic and interest-group politics described by earlier observers such as Gary Freeman (Freeman 1995; see Lahav and Guiraudon 2006) . 34 This transition is not unique to the immigration sector. Beramendi and his colleagues (2015) argue that the politics of advanced capitalist societies generally is experiencing an "electoral turn", in which political parties are less closely allied with specific economic interests and develop more complex coalitions of socioeconomic groups in the electorate. As a consequence, policy is driven less by interest-group bargaining, and more by electoral outcomes. The field of immigration is an exemplar of the electoral turn, and political claims-making has become increasingly dominated by political parties and state agencies (Statham and Geddes 2006; Gava, Giugni and Varone 2013) . The impact is most marked in immigration policy, but integration issues are tugged along its wake.
34 "The role of political parties in politicising immigration issues has heavily increased over the last two decades….immigration became the most polarising issue in the electoral arena during the 1990s as well as the most salient one in protest politics, and has remained in this position ever since…This stands in contrast to the time up to the mid-1980s, when immigration was one of the least politicised issues on the political agenda of European countries, and immigration policy was decided behind closed doors and without public debate" (Helbling, Reeskens and Stolle 2015) .
This suggests that we need after all to return to the original carriers of solidarity: political parties. While much has been written about the decline of political parties, reflected in their often dramatic loss of membership and traditional constituencies, the reality is that they remain important political actors. Moreover, they have not simply stood still and watched the loss of their historic constituencies: they have reached out to build new coalitions, often in successful ways. In the words of a leading analyst, "It turns out that these institutions (of solidarity) may survive least well when they continue to rely solely on coalitions of the past and remain more robust when they carried forward by new coalitions and turned to significantly new ends" (Thelen 2014: 207) . Political parties whose traditional constituencies have dwindled or deserted them have had a strong incentive to reach out to new constituencies -including working women, market outsiders, or salaried professionals --to forge new coalitions (Häusermann 2010) . Faced with the decline of their traditional base in the working-class, to take one example, left parties have tried to attract female voters by adopting policies to support women's employment and increasing the number of female parliamentarians (Morgan 2012 (Morgan , 2009 (Morgan , 2006 .
From our perspective, however, it is critical whether these new coalitions also embrace immigrants and other ethnic minorities. There is no guarantee here. Denmark and the Netherlands are often given high marks for restructuring their welfare states on the basis of new encompassing coalitions, reducing insider-outsider divides and constraining the overall growth of inequality. But these countries also have virulent strains of anti-immigrant sentiment and have excluded newcomers from important social benefits (Sainsbury 2012; Koning 2013) . In these cases, "a strong defense of social solidarity -a strong internal 'community of fate' -seems to have come bundled with strict boundaries to the outside" (Thelen 2014: 200) .
This arguably reflects a structural dilemma for left parties, for whom immigration/integration politics are difficult to manage (Alonso and de Fonseca 2012) . Left parties often oppose high levels of immigration, but tend to defend the interests of immigrants once they have arrived, reflecting both an ideological commitment to social equality and the tendency of naturalized immigrants to vote disproportionately for the left (Messina 2007; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009) . As Lefkofridi and Michel discus in their chapter, this position still carries electoral risks, particularly in countries where populist anti-immigrant parties politicize the alleged "coddling" of immigrants. As a result, left parties often downplay diversity policy in their election manifestos, seeking to deflect political contention to other issues (Bale et al 2010) . Their response to populist criticisms of immigrants is not to defend diversity or champion multiculturalism, but to try to change the topic, and to reduce the political salience of immigration as an issue. 35 Conservative parties tend to be less enthusiastic about immigrant rights but they too risk losing votes to populist anti-immigrant parties if they allow the issue to be politicized. As a result, mainstream parties of both left and right sometimes collaborate in erecting a cordon sanitaire against anti-immigrant parties, refusing to cooperate with them as in Sweden and Belgium, and this can help minimize political backlash against immigrants (Dahlstöm and Esiasson 2011; van Spange and van der Brug 2007) . But even where such a cordon sanitaire is successful, it rarely involves the vocal championing of diversity. The goal is not to mobilize in support of diversity, but rather to depoliticize the issue. It is also striking that cross-party support has been important to the adoption of multiculturalism policies, suggesting the need for electoral cover on such issues (Westlake 2014) .
This analysis of the political champions of inclusive solidarity is discouraging, at least in the short to mid-term. The potential role of progressive civil society coalitions is being displaced by electoral politics, and the electoral dynamics do not reward the vocal embrace of inclusive solidarity. In the 35 A recent study by Helbling, Reeskens and Stolle (2015) suggests that as immigration becomes more politically salient, as measured by its presence in party manifestos, social cohesion declines, regardless of the valence of the discussion. In other words, even positive discussions of immigration and multiculturalism can trigger these negative effects, simply by making the issue more salient. This strengthens the strategic rationale for left parties to avoid the issue. longer term, however, the prospects may be more optimistic, in part because immigrants themselves will become more significant political actors. As immigrant communities grow, their capacity to defend their own interests increases. In the early stages, the most effective recourse is often to the courts and to anti-discrimination protections inherent in domestic law and international agreements (Joppke 2001; Guiraudon 2000) . In some countries, immigrants have also been able to develop active pro-migrant lobbies, exploiting the opportunities created by the particular institutional and discursive structures of their new home. But over time -especially over generations -the immigrant community tends to become a growing component of the electorate, strengthening the incentives for political parties to protect migrant rights. It is not surprisingly that European countries with larger foreign-born populations are more likely to adopt stronger citizenship rights for immigrants (Koopmans et al 2012) . This conclusion is strongly reinforced by the experience of settler societies such as Canada. Canadian history in the 19 th and first half of the 20th century is littered with egregious acts of discrimination and exclusion. It was the political mobilization of minorities --first French-speakers, then Aboriginal peoples, later racialized immigrant minorities -that pushed to country onto a new trajectory. Political parties in Canada now understand that running against immigrants is a short route to political oblivion. Clearly, much depends on political institutions and policies that facilitate minorities' own political agency, a topic to which we turn next.
So this then is our next proposition: Solidarity needs to be built continuously, and there are civil society organizations in all western nations are dedicated to this process. But the politicization of the immigration sector undercuts their effectiveness, and in the long-term, much will depend on immigrants' own political agency and their ability to influence electoral outcomes.
Public institutions and policies
Finally, what are the political institutions and policies that political agents can deploy to reinforce and build solidarity over time? Institutions are obviously critical in shaping the political opportunity structure in any society, helping to define the battlefield on which organized interests and political parties engage. But some analysts insist that political institutions have more direct effects on the norms and attitudes prevailing in society, both among leaders and the public, norms and attitudes which in turn can influence the discursive opportunities available to political agents and the policy responses towards minorities. For our purposes, we are particularly interested in three broad policy regimes: welfare state policies, rights regimes, and integration/diversity policies.
Since Marshall (1950) , the welfare state has been seen as an instrument of social integration, which can strengthen the sense of cohesion and solidarity in diverse societies. Contemporary analysts in this tradition argue that social programs -once established-exercise feedback effects on the attitudes of the public. For example, selective benefits can lock societies into an unending conversation about deservingness, while universal benefits seem to dampen discussion of the legitimacy of different groups of recipients (Larsen, 2006; Swank and Betz, 2003; van Oorschot, 2000) . Others argue that support for redistribution depends more on trust in government than interpersonal trust, and that such trust is sustained by the quality of governance, especially fairness and effectiveness in the actual administration of government programs (Kumlin and Rothstein 2010; Rothstein 1998 Rothstein , 2011 .
These views imply that the quick and non-discriminatory of inclusion of immigrants into the welfare state is likely to promote their inclusion within the collective narratives of bounded solidarity, within the imagined "we". Others, however, have argued that easy access to the welfare state for newcomers reduces their incentive to integrate socially and economically, and moreover provokes majority backlash, as newcomers become associated with welfare dependence (Koopmans 2010) . On this view, immigrants will not be included into the imagined we unless or until the majority sees evidence of their good-faith effort to integrate and to contribute, and easy or unconditional access to the welfare state actually impedes this (Miller 2006) .
To date, the empirical evidence suggests that the public in countries with highly selective welfare states are more inclined to welfare chauvinism, and that egalitarian policies and institutions can help in fighting such sentiments (van der Waal 2013; Larsen, 2006; Swank and Betz, 2003; van Oorschot, 2000) . In his contribution to this volume, Rothstein extends his argument that where institutions are seen as impartial and non-corrupt, citizens express greater trust in their co-citizens and greater support for equalizing policies. In effect, effective institutions enhance political trust, which studies have concerned is more important to redistributive solidarity than interpersonal trust (Soroka et al 2007) . Moreover, Rothstein deploys new research confirming that the trust-building effects of quality institutions offset the negative effects of greater ethnic diversity on trust. In effect, where states have been able to build effective and impartial institutions "from above", these institutions can in turn build their own sources of support and incorporate wider forms of diversity.
The inclusion of immigrants into the welfare state reflects not only the internal logic of particular welfare state regimes, but also, at least in some cases, the logic of judicialized human rights regimes. Indeed, a number of scholars have concluded that the most important source of protection for immigrants' social rights -as well as other basic rights -are domestic and international rights regimes, especially if interpreted by a strong and activist judiciary. These constraints are especially important in the European Union, where member countries are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and are required to open their social programs to all EU citizens who work on their territory (Koning 2013; Guiraudon 2000 Guiraudon , 2002 Joppke 2004; Sainsbury 2012) . The EU has also strengthened the requirements for member states to adopt anti-discrimination measures. Such judicialized rights regimes can be controversial, and governments occasionally seek to circumvent or nullify them. Indeed, some critics argue that they have so many loopholes that they indirectly work to legitimize `neo-nationalist' anti-immigrant policies (Schain 2009 ). But they nonetheless provide important resources for immigrants and their supporters, and also represent a highly symbolic affirmation by the state of an inclusive conception of solidarity, which presumably reinforces such sentiments in the wider culture.
More controversial has been the role of integration/diversity policies. While international human rights norms now set certain minimum standards in terms of racial non-discrimination, they still leave states a great deal of discretion about how they seek to integrate immigrants, including fundamental questions about the terms under which immigrants can gain access to permanent residency and citizenship, and about the extent to which the distinctive identities and practices of immigrants are given any form of public recognition and support. Contemporary democracies have developed distinctive approaches to these questions, with varied choices along two dimensions: multiculturalism policies and civic integration policies. Some countries have responded to growing ethnic diversity with the adoption of multiculturalism policies that recognize distinctive rights or entitlements for ethnic and religious groups. These policies go beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal-democratic state, to also extend some level of public recognition and support for minorities to express their distinct identities and practices. While multiculturalism policies have been more controversial than anti-discrimination policies, many Western democracies adopted the multicultural approach in the later decades of the 20 th century.
Faced with troubling evidence that many immigrants are not integrating effectively into the economic and social mainstream, many countries have also adopted more explicit civic integration policies. Typically, these policies emphasize the importance of employment as a key to integration. They also tend to insist on respect for basic liberal-democratic values, and emphasize the need for newcomers to acquire a basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions. In Europe, this approach is known as 'civic integration' (Council of the European Union 2004; Joppke 2007). Once again, however, there is considerable variation in integration policies across countries. Some countries leave newcomers to their own devices; others encourage integration on a voluntary basis; still others adopt a much more coercive and paternalistic approach. Countries adopting a voluntary approach emphasize immigrants' right to integrate and provide supportive programs.
Countries adopting a more coercive approach have made integration a duty, establishing mandatory programs, and denying immigrants access to social benefits or residency renewals or to naturalization if they fail to pass certain thresholds of integration (Goodman 2010 (Goodman , 2012 .
Not surprisingly, there tends to be a relationship between the choices on the two dimensions of diversity policy. Countries which have adopted stronger multiculturalism policies have also tended to adopt a more voluntary, less coercive approach to integration, and easier access to naturalization. Countries which rejected the multicultural approach in the late 20 th century are more likely to have adopted more coercive or assimilative integrative strategies in the first decade of the 21 st century, and more restrictive access to naturalization (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Bloemraad and Wright 2014). 36 As with the welfare state, controversy swirls around the impact of these diversity regimes on solidarity. Do civic integration policies promote or erode solidarity under conditions of diversity? Do multiculturalism policies promote or erode solidarity? Critics insist that multiculturalism policies exacerbate any underlying trade-off between diversity and redistribution, by encouraging identity politics which crowds out redistributive issues from the policy agenda, corrodes trust among vulnerable groups who would otherwise coalesce in a pro-redistribution lobby, or misdiagnoses the real problems facing minorities, leading them to believe that their problems reflect their culture rather than economic barriers they confront (Barry 2001; Wolfe and Klausen 1997; Hooker 2009 ). Defenders of multiculturalism policies reply that such policies do not create distrust among groups, but rather can ease inter-communal tensions over time, and strengthen the sense of mutual respect, trust and support for redistribution. More open naturalization policies also send a clear statement by the state that immigrants are citizens-in-waiting, who belong here (Morales and Giugni 2011) .
Given the intensity of this debate, there has been surprisingly little research done on the impact of either multiculturalism or civic integration policies on solidarity (Hooker 2009). 37 A number of social psychology studies suggest that multiculturalism policies have beneficial effects on civic solidarity, assessed both cross-nationally (e.g., Guimond et al., 2013) and experimentally (e.g., Levin et al 2012) . There are fewer studies on the impact of such policies on redistributive solidarity. Early studies provided evidence that multiculturalism policies do not, in fact, weaken public support for the welfare state. Countries that have adopted such programs did not experience an erosion of their welfare states or even slower growth in social spending than countries that have resisted such programs (Banting et al 2006) . This finding has been replicated with updated data (available on request) and confirmed in other studies (Brady and Finnigan 2014) .
There is even less evidence about the impact of civic integration policies on solidarity, but the evidence to date suggests that they are not overcoming tendencies towards welfare chauvinism or other exclusionary forms of solidarity (Goodman and Wright 2014; Gundelach and Traunmüller 2014) .
This debate is explored in depth in the chapter by Irene Bloemraad, who also draws a distinction between civil and political solidarity on one hand and redistributive solidarity on the other. The evidence suggests that multicultural policies make a modest positive contribution to both civic and political solidarity, but have little direct effect -either positive or negative -on redistributive solidarity. She also cautions about the potentially "uncivil" effects of civic integration policies with 36 On the factors influencing naturalization policies, see Koopmans et al 2012; Janoski 2010, and Helbling 2008. 37 There has been considerable research done on the impact of diversity policies on other outcomes -for example, how they affect labour market outcomes for immigrants, or how multicultural or bilingual education affects the educational outcomes of immigrants, or how they affect voting and volunteering rates. See, for example, Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Koopmans 2013; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Bloemraad 2006; Kymlicka 2012; and Laxer 2013 . But for the purposes of this project, we are particularly interested in the impact of these policy regimes on solidarity. A policy reform that helps a society achieve better economic returns on immigration need not be evidence of solidarity: it may simply reflect and entrench a view of immigrants as a resource, rather than as equal members of society. We believe that the impacts of policy on solidarity need to be studied on their own terms. overtones of paternalism and distrust. In their chapter, Johnston et al also explore the impact of multiculturalism policies, noting that support for such policies is associated with increased support for redistribution in the United States and English-speaking Canada.
Given the relative scarcity of evidence, it is premature to make definitive pronouncements about the impact of diversity/integration policy regimes on solidarity. If our previous analysis is correct, however, one key factor will be the extent to which these different policy regimes enable individuals from diverse backgrounds to manifest their willing participation in an ethic of membership, including its norms of belonging, civic friendship and reciprocity. This may mean, on the one hand, that insofar as current civic integration policies are coercive, they risk becoming self-defeating as a means of promoting an ethic of membership. When the state claims that civic integration polices must be mandatory in order to be effective, then it simply reaffirms public suspicions that immigrants, left to their own devices, are by inclination uninterested in belonging, and unwilling to contribute and reciprocate. To counteract harsh deservingness judgements, we need instead to create opportunities for immigrants to voluntarily indicate their sense of belonging, civic friendship and reciprocity (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012) . Moreover, many civic integration policies, at least in their coercive form, invoke ideas of national identity in the wrong way. They can be seen in effect as repeated iterations of the "mere mention" tests discussed earlier, repeatedly poking and prodding immigrants asking "are you Dutch yet?", priming national identity in a way that we know is likely to generate exclusionary sentiments.
On the other hand, this may also suggest the need to redefine multiculturalism. A solidaritypromoting form of multiculturalism would connect it to social membership, enabling immigrants to express their culture and identity as modes of participating and contributing to the national society. A solidarity-promoting multiculturalism would start from the premise that one way to be a proud and loyal Canadian is to be a proud Greek-Canadian or Vietnamese-Canadian, and that the activities of one's group -be they religious, cultural, recreational, economic or political -are understood as forms of belonging, and of investing in society, not only or primarily in the economic sense, but in a deeper social sense, even as a form of nation-building. Indeed if there is one thing to be said on behalf of Canadian multiculturalism, it is arguably this: multiculturalism in Canada has always been seen, by both immigrants and native-born citizens, as a means of contributing to society, and indeed a form of nation-building. 38 It is a means of staking a claim to social membership, in part by seeking the accommodations needed to participate more fully and effectively, but also of fulfilling the responsibilities of social membership. Nor is this unique to Canada: the same link between multiculturalism and national contribution is arguably visible in Australia (Levey 2008 (Levey , 2015 or Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006) , all of which have appropriately been described as examples of "multicultural nationalism". 38 This analysis is shared by both defenders of Canadian multiculturalism, such as Varun Uberoi (2008) , and critics, such as Gerald Kernerman (2008) or Richard Day (2000) . They view the fusing of multiculturalism with nation-building as an abandonment of its emancipatory potential. We view it as enabling an ethos of social membership that affirms both diversity and solidarity.
Framing the question as the political sources of solidarity points to a new perspective to the debate about diversity and solidarity. It points to the need for a broader understanding of the relationship, one that adopts long time horizons and investigates multiple layers of political life. Although we have not provided a definitive answer to our question, we have identified a number of important starting points: namely, that solidarity matters to building and sustaining just societies, that an inclusive solidarity is potentially fragile in the face of diversity, and that the tension between diversity and solidarity is mediated by the larger political context in which it unfolds. Political communities, political actors and policy regimes -and the interactions between them --can mediate the relationship.
Simple answers are to be distrusted in this area. As we have seen time and again, relationships are complex and differ significantly from one context to another. Nevertheless, we have drawn a set of propositions from the mass of evidence available in the wider literature and in the chapters in this volume.
Several implications stand out. First, political theorists have established the importance of a sense of shared membership as a basis for solidarity. Empirical studies suggest that a shared commitment to universal (nationally-anonymous) liberal-democratic values can underpin civil and democratic solidarity, but some more bounded sense of membership seems required to underpin redistributive solidarity. The evidence to date does not support the claim that this sense of membership must be rooted in nationhood, or that stronger national identities are inherently more solidaristic, but nevertheless some form of collective identity and sense of belonging together does seem essential to an inclusive solidarity. The empirical studies suggest that if national identity is to provide a basis for inclusive solidarity in diverse societies, it must be both thinned and shaped.
Second, solidarity will not emerge spontaneously, but requires political actors who champion it. Political agents are necessary both to carry the idea of solidarity into politics and to press for its subsequent institutionalization. Clearly, both inclusive and exclusionary predispositions coexist in the attitudes of the public of all democratic electorates. The blend of attitudinal strains undoubtedly differs across countries, but no country is populated exclusively by Kant's race of devils or by multicultural angels. Much depends on the role of the media and political parties in priming and mobilizing opinion around inclusive rather than exclusionary policy frames. In most societies, there are civil society organizations dedicated to this purpose. But the politicization of the immigration sector has tended to sideline such organizations, leaving solidaristic policies vulnerable to the vagaries of electoral politics. In the long-term, immigrants' own political agency as voters in democratic elections probably offers the best protection. But in the short and medium term, additional protections are often needed.
Third, public institutions and policy regimes do have the potential to shape the prospects of inclusive solidarity. The evidence suggest that impartial public institutions, a universal welfare state, strong rights regimes, open naturalization policies, and multiculturalism policies can help build inclusive solidarity, if they are tied to a broader collective identity and to an ethic of membership and belonging. This multicultural nationalism seems a promising avenue for inclusive solidarity, more promising than relying exclusively on the vagaries of power politics or an appeal to universal humanitarianism or on coercive civic integration.
The idea that state policies can influence identities and collective imaginaries is hardly a new theme. In many countries, the nation-building project in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries was state led. In Italy of the 1860s, the Risorgimento did not exist for the bulk of the population, and Mazzini spoke of the need to use the state to develop "a national conception of life" (quoted in Uberoi 2008: 408) . Similarly, Weber argues that the process of turning "peasants into Frenchmen" was powerfully shaped by public schools, new roads, and military service (Weber 1976 ). Hobsbawm broadens the interpretation: states used all such instruments, above all primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of the nation, "often 'inventing traditions' or even nations for this purpose " (1992: 92) . 39 In the contemporary period, the challenge is to shape the identities inherited from these earlier nationbuilders to help normalize diversity in modern life.
